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The Role of U.S. Foreign Policy In
Establishing Jurisdiction: Should Foreign
Policy Be An Exclusively Federal
Concern
By BENJAMIN R. EHRHART*
I. Introduction
This note pits the constitutional notion that in foreign affairs the
nation must speak with one voice against the constitutional notion
that in order to protect federalism the federal courts system must be
"courts of limited jurisdiction."1 Prioritizing these notions lies at the
heart of the following narrow question: Should the federal question
doctrine be invoked when a civil suit, based solely on state law causes
of action, raises the eyebrow of the United States in regard to its
foreign policy? This question has recently bubbled to the surface in
four federal circuits, due largely to economic globalization.2
"Globalization" at its core stands for the significant increase in
the number of international commercial transactions experienced
worldwide.3 For instance, when the United States entered the twenty-
first century one in six domestic private-sector jobs was linked to the
global economy.4 As a result, the number of civil law suits that
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 42 at 273 (James Madison) (famous dictum on the
subject of federalism: "If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be
in respect to other nations"); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and
Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1621 (1997) [hereinafter Federal Courts]; Patrickson
v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 799 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. See e.g., I. Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-Making in International Civil
Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
461,474-484 (1993).
3. Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1635; see generally GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (3d ed. 1996); JAN H.
DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL AND TRADE
LAW (2000).
4. Peter J. Spiro, Role of the States in Foreign Affairs: Foreign Relations
Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1248 (1999).
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involve foreign parties has also increased The large number of civil
suits involving foreign parties has not only raised the issue of federal
subject matter jurisdiction, but also issues of choice of law, forum non
conveniens, enforcement of transnational forum selection clauses and,
more generally, the recognition of foreign judgments.6 Here we
examine whether federal subject matter jurisdiction should be
conferred, and if so, what the threshold requirements should be.
The Second, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have determined that
cases involving important United States foreign policy implications
can be brought in, or removed to, federal court on that basis alone.'
The Ninth Circuit, however, has refused to go along, stating that
"federal courts may [not] assert jurisdiction over a case simply
because a foreign government has expressed a special interest in its
outcome.",8 This note takes the position that cases with foreign policy
implications should be handled by the federal courts because civil
suits affecting U.S. foreign relations should be addressed uniformly,
taking priority over federalist concerns of an over-expansive federal
court system.
II. Federal Question Jurisdiction
"Article III of the U.S. Constitution grants the federal judiciary
'federal question' jurisdiction over 'all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority."' 9 In
1948 Congress granted subject matter jurisdiction to lower federal
courts in all "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States."'0
In order to get into federal court under 28 U. S. Code section
1331, a necessary federal question must appear on the face of the
plaintiff's pleading." This principle has been aptly named the "well-
pleaded complaint rule" and it applies to a plaintiff's attempt to
5. Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1634.
6. Id.
7. See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 1998); see also
Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997) Republic of the
Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2nd Cir. 1986).
8. Patrickson, 251 F. 3d at 803.
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Erin Elizabeth Terrell, Foreign Relations and
Federal Questions: Resolving the Judicial Split on Federal Court Jurisdiction, Note, 35
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1637, 1643 (2002) [hereinafter Foreign Relations].
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1948).
11. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Motley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
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directly invoke general federal question jurisdiction and a defendant's
attempt at removal." The Supreme Court has distinguished well-
pleaded complaints from "artful pleadings" by plaintiffs and
defendants who try to create federal question jurisdiction by
anticipating the course of litigation and pleading federal defenses. 3
There are two ways to find federal jurisdiction under the well-
pleaded complaint rule: "[E]ither that federal law creates the cause of
action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal law.' 4  The "well-
pleaded complaint rule" is firmly rooted in subject matter
jurisprudence because it "keeps [federal courts] from becoming
entangled in state law controversies on the conjecture that federal law
may come into play at some point during the litigation; it also ensures
that Congress retains control over the size of federal court dockets."'5
The overwhelming majority of cases that properly invoke federal
question jurisdiction do so because the claim itself "arises under" a
federal law.' 6 The cases at issue here are those that do not "arise
under" a federal law created by Congress, but rather necessarily
implicate the federal common law of foreign relations. In these
lawsuits the causes of actions are cognizable under state law.
Ill. Federal Common Law
State courts have broad power to develop common law. In
contrast, the federal courts do not have broad powers to develop
common law. However, federal courts may develop common law in
matters delegated to the federal government by the Constitution.
At one time federal courts were freely creating law in areas Congress
12. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983)
(quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)).
13. "Artful pleading" was first recognized and disallowed by the Supreme Court
in Skelly Oil Co. v. Philllips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673 (1950). The Court used
it in that case in reference to the plaintiff's attempt to create federal question
jurisdiction by anticipating a defense.
14. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28 (commonly federal jurisdiction
conferred by a plaintiff's cause of action created by federal law is called the "Holmes
Test" (Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)), and
vindication of plaintiff's state cause of action necessarily depending on the
construction of federal law is referred to as the "necessary construction test." Merrell
Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986)).
15. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 799.
16. Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1621.
17. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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had not addressed.18 This practice reached its high-water mark in
Tyson v. Swift.' 9 In the 1938 decision Erie Railroad v. Tompkins the
Supreme Court ruled that the judiciary's practice of creating federal
law was unconstitutional. After Erie federal courts began applying
state laws except in matters preempted by the federal Constitution
and acts of Congress. Today federal courts create federal common
law in two general areas: 1) when Congress has left the development
of the law to the courts (this is sometimes called "gap-filling"); and 2)
those areas where there is a "sufficiently unique" federal interest at
stake and there is no applicable federal statute.20
The federal common law of foreign relations was created in
response to a unique federal interest in foreign policy. The courts
have established that when neither the legislative or executive
branches have exercised their foreign relations power in response to
an issue in front of a federal court, the default rule is federal common
law and not state law.2
IV. Origin of Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations
The federal common law of foreign relations first arose in the
1960's.22 In the seminal case Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
Banco Nacional de Cuba instituted an action alleging conversion of
bills of lading. The claim was based on the Cuban government's
decree of expropriation of property.23 The question the Court faced
was whether Cuba had title to the property.24 Both the district court
and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found the taking invalid
under international law and granted summary judgment against
Banco Nacional de Cuba.25 The Supreme Court did not consider
whether the expropriation violated international law because it held
that the act of state doctrine precluded the U. S. Court from
18. Tyson v. Swift, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
19. Id.
20. Lumen N. Mulligan, No Longer Safe at Home Preventing the Misuse of
Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations as a Defense Tactic in Private
Transnational Litigation, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2408, 2450 n.13 (2002) (citing Texas
Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)) [hereinafter Misuse
of Federal Common Law].
21. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964);
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Contra Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1665.
22. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398.
23. Id. at 401.
24. Id. at 406.
25. Id. at 406-07.
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scrutinizing public acts of a sovereign power within its territory. In
reaching that conclusion, the Court did not seek authorization
through the Constitution, congressional action or executive order.
Instead, the Court found the doctrine to be implicit in federal law
because of "constitutional underpinnings., 27 The Court analogized
other areas of federal common law thought "necessary to protect
uniquely federal interests" concluding that foreign relations must be
treated "exclusively as an aspect of federal law." It was this analysis
that gave birth to the federal common law of foreign relations.
Four years later this independent power bestowed to the federal
courts was broadened in Zschernig v. Miller.29  The dispute in
Zschernig was over the validity of an Oregon statute that denied
inheritance to East German heirs because East Germans were
entitled to establish reciprocal inheritance rights for their heirs living
in the United States. ° There was no applicable federal law or treaty
directly on point, but the Court believed the statute would have had a
"direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect
the power of the central government to deal with those problems."3'
The Court distinguished Sabbatino from Zschernig noting that
Sabbatino involved an act of state. 32 However, in the same breath the
Court emphasized that Oregon's statute intruded upon the field of
foreign affairs, an area of law textually reserved for Congress and the
President in the Constitution.33  Thus, the Zschernig holding
broadened the federal common law of foreign relations beyond direct
acts of states.
V. Constitutional Underpinnings of the Federal Common Law
of Foreign Relations
Both decisions involved an element of judicial law-making
power, but while Zschering created negative law by asserting what the
states could not do, Sabbatino created positive law, a doctrine that
states must follow. Notwithstanding that distinction, each decision
26. Id. at 421.
27. Id. at 423. ("[The act of state doctrine] arises out of the basic relationships
between branches of government in a system of separation of powers.")
28. Id. at 426, 439.
29. 389 U.S. 429.
30. Id. at 430.
31. Id. at 441.
32. d.at 435.
33. Id. at 432-436.
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wielded its power on the basis of the Constitutional structure. The
central premise was "that the Constitution's assignment of foreign
relations powers to the federal government entails a self-executing
exclusion of state authority."34  The actual enumerated foreign
relations powers are strewn throughout Articles I and 11.35 The
Constitution itself binds the states to the federal common law of
foreign relations under the Supremacy Clause.36
VI. The Circuits Are Split
In all four cases discussed below, the plaintiffs originally filed suit
in state court and the defendants attempted to remove the matter to
federal court.37 Removal attempts were procedural tactics because
federal courts generally have stricter standing requirements, stricter
burdens of proof and more liberal standards for forum non
conveniens 8 Each removal turned on whether a federal question was
34. Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1630 (citing LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6-1 to 6-14, at 401-41 (2d ed. 1988) (just as the commerce
clause in Article I, § 8, cl. 3 has a dormant component to it limiting state regulations
of commerce, so do numerous enumerated foreign relations powers in Articles I and
II)).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal ... No State shall, without the
Consent of the Congress, law any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws... No State shall
lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into
any Agreement or Compact ... with a foreign power, or engage in War, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit delay."); Id. at § 8, cl.
3 (Congress authorized to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations"); Id. at cl. 4
(Congress authorized to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization"); Id. at cl. 10
(Congress authorized to "define and punish ... Offences against the Law of
Nations"); Id. at cl. 11 (Congress authorized to "declare War, grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water");
Id. at cl. 14 (Congress authorized to "make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval forces"); Id. at cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper
Clause); Id. at art. II § 2, cl. 2 (President authorized to make treaties with advice and
consent of two-thirds of senators present).
36. Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1626. Compare Thomas W. Merrill, The
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985) (requiring
something close to specific intent for federal common law to be constitutional and
binding on states), with Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV.
805, 813 (1989) (lowering the threshold to the existence of a national government
interest).
37. See Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 797; Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at1370; Torres,
133 F.3d at 542; Marcos, 806 F.2d at 345.
38. See Armin Rosencranz & Richard Campell, Foreign Environmental and
Human Rights Suits Against U.S. Corporations in U.S. Courts, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
145, 189-190 (1999).
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present because at least one of the defendants was domiciled in the
state of filing, destroying diversity jurisdiction.39 The argument made
by the defendants was that because "U.S. foreign relations would be
implicated by the resolution of the claim and foreign relations are
delegated to the federal government, a federal court should have
original jurisdiction over the case." 40
The three federal district courts that agreed with this argument
relied on Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, which held that when
political relations between the United States and other nations are
implicated federal courts should have jurisdiction.4' The justification
for this holding was that foreign affairs have been, and shall remain,
the exclusive responsibility of the federal government.4 The Ninth
Circuit chose not to read Sabbatino so broadly, finding "that foreign
policy implications from a multinational lawsuit are irrelevant to
consideration of whether the plaintiff's complaint raised a substantial
federal question."43 The Ninth Circuit read Congress'silence on the
issue as an indication of their "endorsement" of the well-pleaded
complaint rule." However, it is the Ninth Circuit's incorrect reading
of the well-pleaded complaint rule that undermines the Ninth
Circuit's reliance on Congress' silence.45
A. Patrickson v. Dole Food Company
In Patrickson v. Dole Food Company, banana workers from
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala and Panama brought a class action
against Dole Food Company and other major fruit companies and
chemical companies alleging injuries sustained from exposure to toxic
pesticides. 46  They filed in Hawaii state court, alleging state law
negligence, conspiracy, strict liability, intentional torts and breach of
implied warranty. Dole submitted a motion to remove the case to
39. See Patrickson, 251 F.3d 795; Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d 1368; Torres, 133
F.3d 540; Marcos, 806 F.2d 344.
40. Foreign Relations, supra note 9, at 1639-40.
41. Id. (citing Patrickson, 251 F.3d 795; Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d 1368; Torres,
133 F.3d 540; Marcos, 806 F.2d 344); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 426.
42. Id.
43. Foreign Relations, supra note 9, at 1641 (citing Patrickson, 252 F.3d at 800-
04).
44. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 803.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 798.
47. Id. at 800.
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federal court.'  Because Dole is incorporated in Hawaii and, for
jurisdictional purposes, a resident of Hawaii, removal was only
potentially proper under federal question jurisdiction." The district
court determined that subject matter jurisdiction existed and
subsequently dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds.0
On appeal the plaintiffs sought to void the removal to federal court.
Judge Alex Kozinski wrote for the three-judge Ninth Circuit
panel. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Second, Fifth and Eleventh
circuits' broad reading of Sabbatino and determined that applying the
federal question doctrine to issues that "arise under" the federal
common law of foreign relations would unduly expand the federal
courts' jurisdiction." First, they distinguished Sabbatino from
Patrickson pointing out that the former involved an act of a state,
while the latter was merely a civil suit involving multinational private
parties. 2 Second, they found no reason why the federal courts would
be better equipped than state courts to handle matters with foreign
relations implications, stating, "[f]ederal judges like state judges, are
bound to decide cases before them according to the rule of law," and
"the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political,
not judicial."53  Lastly, they made clear that foreign government
economics should not be a consideration of the court because
48. Id. at 798.
49. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1994) (stating
that a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and of its principle placed
of business); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (stating that a defendant may not remove to federal
court on diversity of citizenship grounds if defendant is a citizen of the state in which
the case was brought). See David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State
Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit
Injunctions, 68 TEx. L. REV. 937, 950-953 (1990) (Hawaiian courts have not settled
their forum non conveniens doctrine).
50. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 798. The doctrine of forum non conveniens states that
"an appropriate forum - even though competent under law - may divest itself of
jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, it appears that
the action should proceed in another forum in which the action might originally have
been brought." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 664 (7th ed. 1999). The U.S. Supreme
Court further stated in Piper that the doctrine exists " to help courts avoid
conducting complex exercises in comparative law." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 255 (1981). The principle of comity among nations is discussed in Torres.
Torres, 113 F.3d at 542.
51. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 808.
52. Id. at 800; Sabbatino, 307 F.2d at 854 (where the issue was whether to honor
Cuba's request to freeze property within the United States subject to future
proceedings in the foreign state).
53. See Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 804 (quoting In re Tobacco Litig., 100 F. Supp.2d
31, 38 (D.D.C. 2000)).
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economic matters are inherently political.54
B. Republic of Philippines v. Marcos
In Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, the plaintiff filed a
complaint in a state court seeking preliminary injunction prohibiting
the sale of five pieces of New York real estate alleged to have been
beneficially owned by the defendants, the former president of the
Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) Ferdinand Marcos and his
wife." After a removal to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, the judge granted the Philippine government a
preliminary injunction that prohibited the sale or transfer of the New
York real estate. 6 The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit first determined that
Marcos did in fact own the New York real estate. Next it determined
that conclusive factual findings existed for issuing a preliminary
injunction because the Republic had "amply show[n] sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for
litigation together with irreparable harm and a balance of hardships
tipping in [the Republic's] favor."57 The only remaining question was
whether there was federal jurisdiction.
Ironically, at this point all parties advocated for a finding of
federal jurisdiction. The court found federal jurisdiction, but it is
unclear which of the two reasons articulated carried the day. One
reason mentioned was that the Philippine President had issued an
Executive Order and the litigation turned on its enforcement, which
would fall under the act of state doctrine. 9 The other reason was that
"our relationships with other members of the international
community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law."
6
0
The Second Circuit's failure to adequately parse out these two
justifications is precisely where the confusion originates in the
Second, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' arguments. It is this expansive
54. Id.
55. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 346.
56. Id. See also Foreign Relations, supra note 9, at 1650.
57. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 346 (quoting Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc., 596 F.2d. 70, 72 (2d. Cir. 1979)).
58. Id. at 352.
59. The act of state doctrine stands for the proposition that the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within
its own territory. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250,252 (1897).
60. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 352 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425).
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view of federal jurisdiction, without adequate attention paid to legal
reasoning, on which the Fifth and Eleventh circuits relied. This note
recognizes, fleshes out and properly fills the void in reasoning left
lingering between lawsuits that revolve around a state's actions and
those that substantially affect a state. Perhaps more importantly, this
note lays out the reasoning the Second Circuit most likely depended
on, but failed to articulate, and then subsequently draws a brighter
line to help distinguish when federal question jurisdiction under the
federal common law of foreign relations should be triggered.
C. Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation
In Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation, roughly seven
hundred Peruvian citizens from Ilo, Peru filed a state court action in
Texas against the Southern Peru Copper Corporation's copper
smelting and refining operations. The plaintiffs alleged injuries
caused by environmental damage due to sulfur dioxide emissions.62
Because the defendant was incorporated in Delaware and had its
principal place of business in Peru, both plaintiffs and defendants
were foreign nationals, destroying diversity jurisdiction.63
Consequently, defendants requested removal of the case on federal
question grounds.' The district court found federal subject matter
jurisdiction and then dismissed the case on the basis of forum non
conveniens and comity among nations.65
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the federal court lacked
jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule because only state
law tort claims were alleged.66 Chief Judge Politz of the Fifth Circuit
began the jurisdictional analysis by laying out the two bases for
federal question jurisdiction: 1) when the complaint states a cause of
action created by federal law and 2) when a state law cause of action
requires the "resolution of a substantial question of federal law., 67
Next the court defeated the defendant's argument that on its face
Texas law required the examination of a treaty.6" Thus, the matter
applied to the language found in the statutory definition of federal
61. Torres, 113 F.3d at 541.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 542.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. n. 5 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13).
68. Id.
[Vol. 28:2
The Role of U.S. Foreign Policy in Establishing Jurisdiction
question, that "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority."69 The Court applied the
standard developed in Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical Company v.
Thompson, explaining that federal jurisdiction does not exist
independently just because Texas law allows only Texas courts to
hear matters where injury or death occurred on foreign soil when an
examination of U.S. treaties permits.'
Judge Politz, however, went on to find jurisdiction, noting up
front that the Peruvian government's vital interests were largely at
stake, thereby tying in U.S. relations with Peru's economic interests.71
The court pointed to Peru's amicus curiae brief, vigorously opposing
the action and fact-finding which showed Peru's close connection with
the mining industry.' In its conclusion, the court held these facts to
be "substantial questions of federal common law by implicating
important foreign policy concerns.""
Here, the court engaged in intensive fact-finding in order to
make the determination as to whether substantial questions of U.S.
foreign policy existed. This activity is warranted, but the Torres court
added to the confusion originating from Marcos in three ways: First,
69. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (emphasis added) ("The district court shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties.").
70. Torres, 113 F.3d at 542; Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 813 (holding that
"the mere presence of a federal issue... does not automatically confer federal
question jurisdiction" because the federal statute at issue in this case did not intend a
private remedy and that would inhibit congressional intent for the court to provide
the remedy). The Court analogized the federal statute in Merrell Dow to the treaty
at issue in Torres. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 71.031 (Vernon 1995) (allows a
citizen of a foreign country to bring in the Texas state courts an action for personal
injury or death occurring in a foreign nation if the foreign citizen "has equal treaty
rights with the United States on behalf of its citizens").
71. Torres, 113 F.3d at 543.
72. Id. The mining industry in Peru, of which SPCC is the largest company,
is critical to that country's economy, contributing up to 50% of its export income
and 11% of its gross domestic product. Furthermore, the Peruvian government
participated substantially in the activities for which SPCC was being sued. By
way of example, the government: (1) owns the land on which SPCC operates; (2)
owns the minerals which SPCC extracts; (3) owned the Ilo refinery from 1975
until 1994, during which time pollution from the refinery may have contributed
to the injuries complained of by plaintiffs; and (4) grants concessions that allow
SPCC to operate in return for an annual fee. Moreover, the government
extensively regulates the mining industry. This action therefore struck not only
at vital economic interests but also at Peru's sovereign interests by seeking
damages for activities and policies in which the government actively engaged.
73. Id.
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the Torres court based its holding on Marcos without distinguishing
itself from Marcos.7' Second, it failed to clean up the mess left by the
Marcos court's failure to lay out the constitutional underpinnings for
federal jurisdiction based on the federal common law of foreign
relations. Third, it failed to convey the relevant factors that must be
considered going forward in analyzing whether U.S. foreign policy
concerns are substantial enough to invoke federal jurisdiction.
D. Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Company
In Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Company, the plaintiffs were
individuals injured or killed in a 1993 gas pipeline explosion in
Tejerias, Venezuela. 7  Employees of the AT&T Company were
operating a digging machine in order to dig a trench for a fiber optic
cable when they struck a gas pipeline, resulting in the explosion. 6
The plaintiffs filed two separate actions in Georgia state court, one
against AT&T and one against individual employees of AT&T,
alleging that the defendants had participated in acts or omissions that
caused the explosion." The defendants removed the cases to the U.
S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. 78 The district
court consolidated the two actions, denied the motion to remand and
dismissed both actions on the ground of forum non conveniens.79
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to address the
question "whether.. .the district court should have remanded the case
back to the Georgia state court for lack of federal jurisdiction. '' 8 The
defendants put forth four alternative theories for federal
jurisdiction." Only two of the four theories put forth by the
defendants are germane to the circuits' split. First, the defendants
attempted to establish jurisdiction under a Georgia statute that was
substantially similar to the Texas statute in Torres, which depended
on the court's examination of treaties between nations in order to
establish standing. The Eleventh circuit followed the Fifth Circuit's
ruling and determined that "the federal issue [was] collateral to the
74. Torres is distinguishable from Marcos because Torres involved activity that
affected a state and Marcos involved actions of a state.
75. Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at 1371.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1372.
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essence of plaintiffs' state-law claims."' Second, the defendants
argued that federal jurisdiction existed because Venezuela's national
interests involved the federal common law of foreign relations.83 The
court addressed this argument, citing the holding of Sabbatino and
Marcos, saying that "the area of international relations is governed
exclusively by federal law" and "where a state law action has as a
substantial element an issue involving foreign relations or foreign
policy matters, federal jurisdiction is present."" The court then
distinguished the two decisions, noting that in Sabbatino a foreign
state was a named party and in Marcos the action of the Republic of
Philippines was the main issue in the litigation.8
The court's most significant contribution to clearing up the
ambiguity left by Marcos and Torres was that it articulated the factors
to be considered in determining whether the claim implicated "the
economic and sovereign interests of Venezuela." The factors to
consider are 1) the location of the injury, 2) whether the state's policy
decisions or actions are brought into question by the suit, 3) whether
the state itself was involved in the wrongdoing and 4) whether the
action strikes at the heart of the economic and sovereign interest of
the foreign nation. 7 The Eleventh Circuit applied the test formulated
in Torres but, unlike the Torres court, they found no jurisdiction. The
pivotal factors for ruling that no federal jurisdiction existed were that
Venezuela took no official position on where the litigation should
take place and that whether Venezuela had any direct interests in the
plaintiffs' action was "too speculative and tenuous."'' It can be
inferred from the court's decision that, had the plaintiffs been able to
intertwine their interests with those of Venezuela and show that those
interests did meet the threshold level of economic and sovereign
interests, the Eleventh Circuit would have held that jurisdiction
82. Id. at 1376. See generally People of Puerto Rico v. Russell, 288 U.S. 476
(1933) (in which the court held that federal jurisdiction was lacking where the
plaintiff's right to proceed in the courts on its state law-based cause of action was
authorized by a federal statute). See also Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th
Circ. 1968) (holding that a similar treaty granting access to United States courts but
not establishing substantive rights does not create a right "arising under" the treaties
of the United States for purposes of federal jurisdiction).
83. Foreign Relations, supra note 9, at 1654.
84. Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at 1377 (quoting Marcos, 806 F.2d at 344).
85. Id. at 1376-78.
86. Foreign Relations, supra note 9, at 1656 (citing Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at
1371).
87. Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at 1371.
88. Id. at 1377.
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existed.89
VII. A Functional Reading of Torres"
Torres extended federal question jurisdiction to state causes of
action significantly affecting U. S. foreign policy, even when a foreign
state is not a party to the litigation.9' The court, although only
providing two paragraphs of guidance, laid out a test that could be
construed more functionally to keep federal jurisdiction under
control. Reading the test as requiring the fulfillment of three
circumstances with the final circumstance as a balancing factor would
effectively erase the ambivalence plaguing this area of federal
common law and would effectively maintain limited federal dockets.
In order for the federal common law of foreign relations to meet the
level of a unique federal interest, conferring concurrent federal
jurisdiction, the following must be met under a functional Torres test:
1) the foreign government files an official position with the court
(amicus curiae brief); 2) the plaintiffs are of foreign origin; 3) the
alleged injuries are also of foreign origin; and 4) the cause(s) of action
must significantly affect the vital economic and sovereign interest of
foreign state.93 The Torres model employs the necessary construction
test of the well-pleaded complaint rule, rather than the Holmes test,
to determine whether the federal common law of foreign relations is
necessarily implicated.94
The first requirement would ensure that the potentially affected
foreign state is attentive to the matter and it would allow the federal
government to gain knowledge about that foreign government's
position. The second requirement forces the private transaction to be
truly international. This requirement is justifiable by analogizing
diversity jurisdiction requirements when injuries occur in a state, but
involve citizens of other states. The third helps to establish that the
89. See generally id.
90. Compare Misuse Of Federal Common Law, supra note 20, at 2419-22
(proposing a different reading of the Torres test and arguing it lacks Constitutional
support and would result in a significant influx to federal courts' dockets).
91. See generally Torres, 113 F.3d at 543.
92. Id.
93. Id. But cf Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 801-05. See also Marathon Oil Co. v
Rurhgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997) (court refused to grant federal
question jurisdiction because injuries took place, at least partially, on United States
soil).
94. Id. See supra note 14 for a definition of the Holmes test and necessary
construction test.
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cause of action is on the periphery of state court interests. By
insisting that the situs of injury be on foreign soil it is unlikely that a
specific state's public policy would be implicated in the outcome.
Lastly, the balancing factor limits the federal courts to those matters
that rise to a unique federal interest.
By reading Torres' model as a limiting mechanism, as the
Eleventh Circuit alludes to in Pacheco de Perez, rather than as an
expansion of the federal question doctrine, following Marcos, the
model becomes workable. Under this reading, absent demonstrative
evidence of the first three requirements, the federal courts would not
even consider whether the litigation could significantly affect the vital
economic and sovereign interests of a foreign state. Thus, although a
case-by-case analysis would still be necessary, the process is
streamlined and parties involved in litigation would have notice of the
requirements that must be met before consideration of filing in
federal court. This more stringent case-by-case analysis will
adequately protect the power of the federal government to address
issues of foreign policy while causing only a slight increase in federal
courts' dockets.
VIII. The Ninth Circuit Reads Section 1331 Too Narrowly
The Ninth Circuit rejects the idea that these cases raise
substantial issues of federal common law and thus arise under the
laws of the United States.95 The Ninth Circuit questions the legal
analysis employed by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and also makes
functional arguments against reading section 1331 too broadly.
A. Ninth Circuit Engaged in a Narrow Reading of the Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule5
Analytically the Patrickson court objected to the Torres court's
model because the Ninth Circuit viewed the model as an exception to
the well-pleaded complaint rule under the Holmes test, rather than a
corollary to the rule under the necessary construction test.97 They
disputed that because the plaintiff's complaint alleged only state law,
any federal law arising in the case could only be raised as a defense.98
This resulted in the Ninth Circuit immediately dismissing the model
95. Misuse of Federal Common Law, supra note 20, at 2429-32.
96. See also id. at 2425-32.
97. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 800-01. See also id. at 2426-29.
98. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 800-01.
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because Congress or the federal common law of foreign relations had
not pre-empted the state tort law.99
The Ninth Circuit's understanding of the well-pleaded complaint
rule is parochial because the argument only considers the Holmes test
and fails to contemplate the necessary construction test." The
necessary construction test confers concurrent jurisdiction when a
state cause of action necessarily depends on the construction of
federal law.1" ' The federal common law of foreign relations has never
been employed to entirely pre-empt state causes of action, it merely
has supplied standards for certain foreign affairs issues, while the
remaining elements of applicable state law still governed.1"2 The
Ninth Circuit was correct when it pointed out that only Congress has
the power to grant the lower federal courts exclusive jurisdiction.
However, they failed to consider that even if Sabbatino was merely a
choice of law decision under Erie, concurrent jurisdiction could still
be constitutional and compulsory by using the Supremacy Clause to
bind state courts to the federal common law of foreign relations.
The Ninth Circuit's second argument against reading section
1331 broadly is that when the Second Circuit decided Marcos they
read Sabbatino as only extending federal jurisdiction to when the
validity of an act of state is at issue.0 3 Therefore, according to the
Ninth Circuit, the Fifth and Eleventh circuits incorrectly expanded
the federal common law of foreign relations to confer federal
question jurisdiction when foreign states only have a substantial
interest, regardless of the validity of a state action.10' However, this
restricted view of Sabbatino fails to consider Zschernig. In Zschernig
there was no validity of a foreign state's act in question, the Supreme
Court held the Oregon inheritance statute intruded upon federal
grounds because of the "potential impact" the statute could have on
99. Id.
100. See Misuse of Federal Common Law, supra note 20, at 2426-29 (citing Merrell
Dow Pharm,. 478 U.S. at 408-09).
101. See supra note 13.
102. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 378 (the only issue governed by the federal
common law of foreign relations was whether Cuba's expropriation was valid, every
other element was conversion tort under state law). See Marcos, 806 F.2d at 346
(additionally in Marcos, the only federal common law of foreign relations issue was
whether the Filipino executive order was valid).
103. See supra note 54; Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 801-05.
104. See generally Torres, 113 F.3d at 543. See also Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at
1377.
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foreign affairs with East Germany1 The Supreme Court's decisions
are binding precedent on the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court
has decided time and time again that "federal common law exists ...
[in] disputes implicating... our relations with foreign nations. 10 6 The
Ninth Circuit inexplicably disregards the Supreme Court's clear
precedent applying the federal common law of foreign relations to
instances when United States foreign relations are implicated,
regardless of the act of state doctrine.
0 7
B. The Ninth Circuit's Pragmatic Arguments
The Ninth Circuit makes two pragmatic arguments. First, that
"[f]ederal judges, like state judges, are bound to decide cases before
them according to the rule of law.""08  Second, foreign relations
considerations are "inherently political" and by forcing courts to
weigh whether foreign interests are substantial enough to confer
federal jurisdiction necessarily requires courts to make political
judgments."° The court goes on to say that this practice is not "within
the competence of either state or federal courts" because it violates
the constitutional preference for separation of powers and because
judges lack political accountability."' Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit
specifically attacks Torres' focus on whether a foreign state has filed
an amicus brief because if a court rules in opposition to the foreign
government's position it will be viewed by that government as an
affront."'
C. Counter Arguments to the Ninth Circuit's Pragmatic Arguments
It is true that both state and federal judges are bound by the rule
of law, but every law has an interpretive quality, and it is the courts'
responsibility to breathe life into the law. Functionally, state courts
lack national perspective and have a tendency to be self-serving at the
expense of other states."2  Furthermore, federal courts are not
105. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432.
106. Misuse of Federal Common Law, supra note 20, at 2431-32 (quoting Texas
Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641). See generallyForeign Relations, supra note 4, at1241-
1243 (establishing Zchernig as standing for this proposition).
107. See also Misuse of Federal Common Law, supra note 20, at 2432.
108. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 803.
109. Id. at 804.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See generally Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts:
Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024,1048-67 (1967).
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subjected to the local political processes that plague state courts and
so they are able to be more sensitive to national foreign relations
interests."3 The potential harms of not adhering to these realities
would be either a state court decision that would go against the
federal government's foreign policy agenda or a state court decision
that offends a foreign state and causes a nationwide danger."4 Even if
the uniform law established under federal court decisions was sub-
standard to that of individual state interpretations of the federal
common law of foreign relations, the swiftness and broad scope with
which federal judicial errors could be mitigated by other federal
branches of government is preferable..5 Decisions made by state
courts exclusively would lead to a piecemeal approach that would be
impossible to fix uniformly. For these reasons concurrent federal
jurisdiction should exist for matters that have a "sufficiently unique"
federal interest . 6
The Ninth Circuit's speculative fear of affronting a foreign state
by acknowledging a foreign state's filing of a brief as a factor to be
considered and then ruling against that state's interest is an avoidable
circumstance because the political question doctrine, forum non
conveniens, and other abstention doctrines ensure that federal courts
will not get entangled in hot-button controversial international
politics.17 As the Ninth Circuit reminds us, questions of foreign
policy with great impact are best left to the political branches to
resolve.
IX. Conclusion
The current circuit split must be resolved. The ambivalent uses
of the federal common law of foreign relations against the backdrop
of converging domestic and foreign relations spheres makes the
Supreme Court's certiorari imperative."8 In the Supreme Court's
interest of balancing constitutional notions of uniformity in foreign
affairs and the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the functional
Torres model should be followed.
113. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSION IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 137-138 (2d ed. 1990).
114. Sabbatino was decided two years after the Cuban Missile Crisis.
115. Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 1669.
116. Texas Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 640; See also Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. 64.
117. Under this note's interpretation of Torres, the filing of an amicus brief would
be a requirement.
118. See Garvey, supra note 2.
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